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The Economic Consequences of Labor 
Market Regulations 
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde† 
ABSTRACT 
What do we know about the economic consequences of labor market regulations? 
Few economic policy questions are as contentious as labor market regulations. The 
effects of minimum wages, collective bargaining provisions, and hiring/firing 
restrictions generate heated debates in the U.S. and other advanced economies. 
And yet, establishing empirical lessons about the consequences of these regulations 
is surprisingly difficult. In this paper, I explain some of the reasons why this is the 
case, and I critically review the recent findings regarding the effects of minimum 
wages on employment. Contrary to often asserted statements, the preponderance of 
the evidence still points toward a negative impact of permanently high minimum 
wages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The labor market is a central institution in any modern economy. 
This market allocates workers to jobs. If the labor market operates 
satisfactorily, workers will find employment at the right speed, and 
these positions will be appropriate to their experience and skill. If the 
market does not function properly, willing workers will remain 
unemployed for too long, vacancies will stay unfilled, and many workers 
will occupy positions that are unsuited for them. Moreover, firms will 
not appear, grow, or close at the optimal rate. 
At the same time, the labor market is characterized by pervasive 
regulation.1 Across nations, the labor market is subject to minimum 
 
 † Correspondence: jesusfv@econ.upenn.edu. I thank John Cochrane, Richard Epstein, 
Jonathan Meer, and participants at several seminars for comments. Paul Sangrey supplied superb 
research assistance. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science 
Foundation under Grant SES 1223271. 
 1 See, e.g., Andrew J. Seltzer, The Effects of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 on the 
Southern Seamless Hosiery and Lumber Industries, 57 J. ECON. HIST. 396, 396–415 (1997) 
(discussing the implementation of the Federal minimum wage via the Fair Labor Standards Act 
and the resulting impact on Southern industries); see also John Haltiwanger, Top Ten Signs of 
Declining Business Dynamism and Entrepreneurship in the U.S. 9 (Aug. 2015), http://econ 
web.umd.edu/~haltiwan/Haltiwanger_Kauffman_Conference_August_1_2015.pdf [https://perma. 
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wages, hiring and firing restrictions, compulsory collective bargaining 
and arbitrage, limitations on the number of hours, anti-discrimination 
clauses, curtailments on work by age, and (mostly in the past) by 
gender. Some of these regulations, such as well-designed 
unemployment insurance,2 improve the behavior of the market. As a 
society, we want workers to search for a sufficiently lengthy period for 
a job corresponding to their skills, instead of accepting the first job offer 
they get, as could be the case if workers did not have any insurance and 
lacked savings.3 
But there are also other regulations, such as excessive firing costs 
or restrictive collective bargaining rules, that lower economic 
performance.4 Unfortunately, many of these harmful regulations are 
adopted, ignoring what economists have learned about how the labor 
market works (and economists’ vocal opposition to them). Whether this 
is due to political-economic pressures (i.e., politically powerful groups 
can gain from these regulations what they could not obtain in a free 
market) or to a misunderstanding of economics is irrelevant to my 
argument. Bad regulations hurt workers and firms and lower welfare. 
Southern European countries are the poster children of these maladies. 
My own native Spain, for example, has endured fifty-five quarters of 
unemployment above 20% since 1980 and the unemployment rate has 
fallen below 8% only for one quarter (2007.Q2, at 7.93%), despite two 
vigorous economic expansions.5 
If costly labor market regulations were limited to Mediterranean 
countries, one could dismiss them as universal justice getting even with 
countries blessed with lovely weather, natural beauty, and civilized 
food. In fact, this is implicitly the response of many defenders of 
regulations in Southern Europe: unemployment just happens, and labor 
 
cc/5FS4-9K2G] (written for the Kauffman Foundation New Entrepreneurial Growth Conf.) 
(stating that regulations may create barriers for firms and workers acclimating to economic 
changes, and analogizing the subsequent friction to “death by a thousand cuts”). 
 2 See Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, Efficient Unemployment Insurance, 107 J. POL. 
ECON. 893, 894 (1999) (arguing that moderate levels of unemployment insurance produce optimal 
levels of labor search efforts). 
 3 See id. (A more generous unemployment insurance also lowers the intensity of job search. 
A wise policymaker must balance this lower search effort against the benefits of better employment 
matches.) 
 4 See Charles Brown, Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of Income, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2101, 2101–63 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1st ed. 
1999) (describing how voluntary turnover can help mitigate some of the high costs of firing); see 
also Daniel Aaronson, et al., Industry Dynamics and the Minimum Wage: A Putty-Clay Approach, 
58 INT’L ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that putty-clay models change our assessment of 
the effects of firing costs, labor market policies, and taxes). 
 5 Economically Active Population Survey, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA, http://www. 
ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/en/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176918&menu=resultados
&secc=1254736195129&idp=1254735976595 [https://perma.cc/774K-WAEP]. 
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law does not have anything to do with it.6 Disappointingly, perverse 
labor market regulations can be found everywhere. Even more 
worrisome are the growing signs in the U.S. that the labor market is 
performing worse than in the past, a situation that has large potential 
consequences for productivity growth and welfare.7 The effects, in the 
long-run, of even small reductions in the trend of productivity growth 
are so severe that they deserve careful examination and, if possible, 
immediate corrective action. In comparison, slightly better or worse 
fiscal and monetary policies, and the feed of daily media discussion, are 
much less consequential for aggregate welfare.8 
In this paper, I will start by analyzing data from the U.S. labor 
market (Section 2) and outlining a few implications from the evidence 
(Section 3). Next, I will use changes in the minimum wage as a case 
study of what we know about the effects of labor market regulations. In 
that way, I will explain how economists have looked at the empirical 
evidence (Section 4), the problems of this evidence (Section 5). I will 
conclude with why these problems still suggest a negative assessment 
of “fight for $15” and some final brief remarks (Section 6). 
II. FIRST, SOME DATA 
A starting point to study the U.S. labor market is two datasets 
elaborated by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The first dataset is 
the Business Employment Dynamics (BED), which reports quarterly 
series of gross job gains and gross job losses by establishments since 
1992 for the entire economy (with a few minor exceptions).9 An 
establishment is an economic unit, typically at one location (e.g., the 
Chicago office of a law firm).10 The firm is a collection of one or more 
establishments (e.g., the Chicago and the New York offices of a law 
 
 6 It is tragicomic to read the remembrances of one Spanish economist, Juan Francisco 
Jimeno, who has been involved for decades in trying (and failing) to convince politicians, trade 
unionists, and labor law professors that counterproductive labor protections were behind the 
Spanish labor market’s dysfunctionality. See JUAN FRANCISCO JIMENO, CRECIMIENTO Y EMPLEO 
(2016). 
 7 Haltiwanger, supra note 1, at 1 (noting flexibility is imperative to economic growth, and 
acknowledging that “declines in dynamism and fluidity” have adverse effects on economic growth). 
 8 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Macroeconomic Priorities, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (concluding 
fiscal and monetary policies have an impact on welfare, but general stabilization attempts through 
such policies are far inferior to “supply-side fiscal reforms”). 
 9 Business Employment Dynamics, U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls. 
gov/bdm/ [https://perma.cc/35CU-7PLL]. 
 10 See Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T 
LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/cew/cewfaq.htm [https://perma. 
cc/3JQF-TR2B]. 
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firm).11 The changes in establishment employment are measured from 
the third month of each quarter. 
The second dataset is the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey 
(JOLTS), a monthly representative sample of around 16,000 U.S. 
business establishments, which measures hires, separations, and job 
openings.12 In this survey, hires and separations are collected for the 
entire calendar month and employment at the end of the month. 
The main difference between these two datasets is their focus. BED 
measures job flows: job creation by opening and expanding 
establishments and job destruction by closing and contracting 
establishments.13 Let us go back to the office of a law firm as an example 
of an establishment. If the firm employs ten persons in the third month 
of Q1 and twelve in the third month of Q2, the job creation rate in 
quarter two would be 18.2%. If, in the third month of Q3, the firm 
employs eleven persons, the job destruction rate in Q3 would be 8.7%. 
However, the employees that are employed throughout these quarters 
may be different persons. In comparison, JOLTS measures worker 
flows: hires, layoffs, quits, and job openings.14 Often, layoffs and quits 
are grouped as separations, since ascertaining whether these 
separations were voluntary can be difficult. (For example, was a quit a 
few days before a foreseen layoff voluntary?) An establishment with no 
job creation/destruction can experience hires, layoffs, and quits. 
Similarly, an establishment with job creation can have separations and 
an establishment with job destruction can have hires. 
Both BED and JOLTS are collected at the establishment level, not 
at the firm level. This choice avoids dealing with legal issues regarding 
corporate forms. Furthermore, establishments reflect better than firms 
the underlying structure of economic activity and the changes to 
resource allocation over time. A disadvantage of these data is that we 
do not know the extent of reallocation within the establishment. For 
example, if a paralegal completes law school at night, passes her bar 
exam, and becomes an associate, but within the same law office, even if 
her job may have changed dramatically, she will not be counted either 
 
 11 The Bureau of Labor Statistics states: “An establishment is commonly understood as a 
single economic unit, such as a farm, a mine, a factory, or a store, that produces goods or services. 
Establishments are typically at one physical location and engaged in one, or predominantly one, 
type of economic activity for which a single industrial classification may be applied. A firm, or a 
company, is a business and may consist of one or more establishments, where each establishment 
may participate in different predominant economic activity.” Id. 
 12 Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey: JOLTS Overview, U.S. DEP’T LAB., BUREAU OF 
LAB. STAT. (July 14, 2014), https://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltover.htm [https://perma.cc/2ECE-6DAW] 
[hereinafter JOLTS Overview]. 
 13 See Business Employment Dynamics, supra note 9. 
 14 See JOLTS Overview, supra note 12. 
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as a job or a worker flow. Many economists suspect that internal 
reallocation is a central mechanism of the labor market and key for 
firms’ growth.15 
 
 
Figure 1: Hires and job creation for U.S. private non-farm, quarterly16 
We can plot the information from BED and JOLTS to gain a quick 
sense of the behavior of the U.S. labor market. In Figure 1, Professor 
Haltiwanger plots the job creation rate of the U.S. economy (total job 
creation divided by total employment) and hires (total hires divided by 
total employment), with shaded areas representing economic recessions 
in the U.S. as defined by the NBER (the conventional source for such 
dating). Job creation fluctuated around 8% during the 1990s and 
declined during the 2000s until 2009, when it reached a minimum below 
6% and started growing again, but without returning to the same levels 
as at the beginning of the sample. Note how, even at the bottom of the 
financial crisis, job creation was still considerable. When BED data 
were first made available in the 1990s, economists were surprised by 
the stability of job creation over recessions. Hires were always higher, 
with peaks of nearly 18% and troughs of around 11%. Again, we saw a 
long-term decline in the hiring rate (even sharper than the one in the 
job creation rate) that the current expansion has partially reversed. 
 
 
 15 Haltiwanger, supra note 1, at 1, 8 (implying “that there should be a rise in dynamism as 
there are increased incentives for reallocation”). 
 16 Id. at 20. 
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Figure 2: Layoffs, quits and job destruction for U.S. private non-farm, quarterly, 
1990.Q2–2015.Q1.17 
In Figure 2, Professor Haltiwanger plots the job destruction rate of 
the U.S. economy (total job destruction divided by total employment), 
layoffs (total layoffs divided by total employment), and quits (total quits 
divided by total employment). We see, first, that the U.S. economy is a 
net creator of jobs over time: job destruction is nearly always below job 
creation, except during the financial crisis and its immediate aftermath 
(2007.Q4–2010.Q1). Second, job destruction and layoffs are roughly 
constant during expansions (although, as with job destruction, with a 
negative trend over time), but they peak during recessions, in particular 
in 1992 and 2008–2009. Unemployment grows in recessions primarily 
not because fewer jobs are created, but because more jobs are destroyed. 
Finally, quits are strongly countercyclical: workers leave their jobs 
during the late phase of expansions (1996–2000, 2005–2007), but they 
are reluctant to do so during a recession (note the huge drop between 
2007 and 2010). Over time, layoffs and separations have a similar 
mean, roughly doubling—when added together—the rate of job 
destruction. 
 
 17 Id. at 21. 
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III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE FACTS 
The previous section presented basic facts about turnover in the 
U.S. labor market. However, these findings were expressed in units 
(percentages of employment) that may say little to many readers. 
Let me, thus, recast the data in a more salient form. In 2016.Q1, 
the most recent vintage of data as of December 2016, the job destruction 
rate in the private sector was 5.7%, in line with previous quarters.18 
This 5.7% corresponds, given the around 121 million employees of the 
U.S. private sector, to 6.78 million destroyed private jobs (seasonally 
adjusted). There are around 500 regular business hours in a quarter.19 
If we divide 6.78 million jobs by 500 hours, we get that 13,566 jobs are 
destroyed per regular business hour or around 226 jobs per minute. 
Even accounting for longer hours per quarter of substantial economic 
activity, the amount of job creation and destruction that the U.S. 
economy seems to require in every minute it operates even in good times 
is staggering. 
The total number of separations is even more impressive. There 
were 15.23 million separations in 2016.Q1 (also seasonally adjusted) in 
the non-farm sector. Repeating the same calculation as before, we get 
around 508 separations per minute. In less time than it took you to read 
this page, 508 workers in the U.S. private sector have abandoned the 
establishment where they used to work. The numbers for job creation 
and hires are slightly higher since, in 2016.Q1, the U.S. private sector 
added 197,000 net jobs. And, because of data limitations, we are not 
accounting for reallocations of jobs within a given establishment. 
The U.S. labor market is a complex system. Its emerging properties 
are the product of thousands of decisions made every minute about 
what, how, and where to produce, whom to hire, fire, or promote, how 
to supervise, compensate, or penalize workers, and plenty of other 
considerations. 
Our understanding of how this market works is extremely limited. 
Even our statistical sources are quite scarce.20 BED and JOLTS, 
 
 18 Business Employment Dynamics, supra note 9. 
 19 There are 62.5 business days on average per quarter. If we multiply those by 8 hours per 
day, we get 500 hours. Seasonal adjustment takes care of the different number of business days 
across quarters of the year. 
 20 See, e.g., Friedrich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 4 
(1989) (discussing how researchers can determine what conditions might create a market 
equilibrium, but that econometric methods cannot show how the “prevailing prices and wages 
deviate from those which would secure a continuous sale of the current supply of labour”); see also 
Charles Brown, et al., The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment, 20 J. 
ECON. LIT. 487, 500 (1982) (recognizing the difficulties in statistically separating the effects of 
minimum wage increases and coverage extensions). 
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valuable as they are, only scratch the surface of what we would like to 
document. For example, and as I already mentioned, we have little 
information about job reallocation within firms, about on-the-job 
training, or about how workers allocate their time on the job, such as 
how much time an average manager spend supervising subordinates vs. 
meeting with clients. We know, however, that the economy requires 
colossal amounts of resource reallocation per quarter. The fact that such 
reallocation is slowing down (as shown by the decreasing trends of job 
creation and job destruction in Figure 1 and Figure 2) precisely at the 
time when labor productivity is growing at a crawl suggests a link 
between the former and the latter. Less reallocation limits the 
economy’s ability to take advantage of new technologies and 
opportunities.21 
Given our poor understanding of how the labor market operates, 
prudence dictates extreme care before changing the rules that govern 
it. Furthermore, one must be concerned about the regulatory 
innovations introduced during the last two decades (plus the 
uncertainty associated with their vagueness and often changing 
interpretation by administrative agencies). More (and more uncertain) 
regulations are usually associated with less reallocation in markets. 
Regulations tend to make it costlier to switch jobs or to create openings 
(for example, due to higher compliance costs). Greater uncertainty 
induces what economists call “precautionary behavior,” which in this 
case manifests itself as a bias toward the status quo. The pretense of 
knowledge, the seductive yet ultimately treacherous tempter of social 
scientists, is peculiarly dangerous in this area.22 
As we will see in the next sections, the minimum wage offers a 
splendid example of the unintended consequences of well-meaning, but 
ill-informed regulation of a complex system. 
IV. A CHANGING VIEW? 
The traditional view among economists of the effect of minimum 
wages is simple. The market for labor (more properly, for a specific type 
of labor at a particular location, such as low-skill workers in Chicago’s 
downtown) is characterized by a supply function for labor and a demand 
 
 21 Real output per hour in the non-farm business sector as computed by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics increased 3.6% in the 5 years between 2011.Q3 and 2016.Q3, an annualized rate of 0.72% 
a year. Between 1947.Q1 and 2011.Q3, the annual rate was 2.24% a year. At the 1947.Q1/2011.Q3 
rate, labor productivity doubles every 31 years. At the 2011.Q3/2016.Q3 rate, labor productivity 
doubles every 97 years. 
 22 Hayek, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that economists attempt to imitate successful physical 
sciences, but the aspects for which economists “can get quantitative data are necessarily limited 
and may not include the important ones”). 
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function for labor (see Figure 3).23 The supply function increases with 
wages: a higher wage induces more persons into the labor force and 
those who are already employed to work more hours. The demand 
function falls with wages: as wages rise, firms use less labor—perhaps 
using more or newer machines, scaling back operations and only doing 
more profitable projects or closing less profitable locations, offshoring, 
or, in the case of the minimum wage, substituting to higher-priced but 
more productive workers. The supply and demand function intersects 
at a wage, w, that clears the market at level q. 
A legally imposed minimum wage, wm, above w, prevents the 
market from clearing: supply, qs, is too high and demand, qd, too low. 
Instead, the market clears on the short side. In other words, the amount 
of labor transacted in the market is demand-determined: 
 
Figure 3: Labor market and effects of the minimum wage24 
Unemployment is equal to the difference between demand, qs, and 
supply, qd. The higher the minimum wage, wm, the higher the level of 
unemployment. The size of the gap between demand and supply will 
depend on the elasticities of each side of the market. 
 
 23 The market for labor described here is a streamlined textbook representation. Models used 
in research are more nuanced. More concretely, these models emphasize the search and matching 
problem at the core of the pairing of workers and firms. For a review of labor economics, see PIERRE 
CAHUC & ANDRÉ ZYLBERBERG, LABOR ECONOMICS 718–19 (2004). 
 24 See Brown, supra note 4 at 2104; see also Brown et al., supra note 20, at 488. 
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This traditional view, taught to generations of undergraduates, 
was supported by a large body of empirical research summarized by 
Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen,25 who concluded: “On balance, a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage is estimated to result in about a 1–3% 
reduction in total teenage employment.”26 
This core understanding of how the labor market works was shaken 
by the publication of Card and Krueger (1994)27 and, one year later, by 
a companion book, Myth and Measurement (Card and Krueger 1995),28 
to wide praise. 
Card and Krueger were interested in quantifying the effects of the 
minimum wage on employment.29 With that goal in mind, they laid 
down a transparent research design that took advantage of a “quasi-
natural experiment.” On April 1, 1992, New Jersey increased the 
minimum hourly wage from $4.25 to $5.05. Pennsylvania, in contrast, 
kept the minimum wage at $4.25.30 
Exploiting this sudden difference in minimum wages between two 
regions, New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania, that share a common 
socio-economic environment, Card and Krueger surveyed by phone the 
employment levels, ten months later, of 410 fast-food restaurants in the 
area and compared them with the employment levels before the change 
in New Jersey’s legislation. The map in Figure 4, reproduced from Card 
and Krueger 1995,31 plots the location of the surveyed restaurants.32 
 
 
 25 Brown et al., supra note 20, at 488. 
 26 Id. at 505. 
 27 David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994). 
 28 DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE 
MINIMUM WAGE (1995). 
 29 Card & Krueger, supra note 27, at 773. 
 30 Id. at 772. 
 31 CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 28, at 28. 
 32 A total of 473 restaurants were sampled and replies were obtained from 410 of them, 331 
in New Jersey and 79 in Pennsylvania. Card & Krueger, supra note 27, at 774. Note that for the 
research design to be informative, we do not need a full equivalence of initial conditions between 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, just that the changes both regions experienced during the 
subsequent ten months (business cycle effects, demographic variations, etc.) were roughly 
equivalent. This requirement is called the parallel trend assumption. See Alberto Abadie, 
Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 1–2 (2005) 
(explaining the parallel trend assumption as a concept in which “the conventional [difference-in-
differences] estimator requires that in absence of the treatment, the average outcomes for treated 
and controls would have followed parallel paths over time”). 
06 FERNANDEZ VILLAVERDE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  9:11 AM 
119] ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION 129 
 
 
Figure 4: Labor market and effects of the minimum wage 
This technique of comparing the evolution of a variable of interest 
is known as difference in differences (DID).33 Two groups are observed 
in two moments in time. One is the “control” group (here, the 
Pennsylvania restaurants) and the second is the “treatment” group 
(here, the New Jersey restaurants). The treatment group is exposed to 
the treatment in the second moment (the higher hourly minimum 
wage), but not in the first. The control group is not exposed to the 
treatment in either moment. By comparing the changes in the 
treatment and the control group over time, we can measure the causal 
effect of the treatment even if there were additional trends over time 
unrelated to the treatment. 
To most economists’ surprise, Card and Krueger documented a 
relative increase in employment in New Jersey of 2.76 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees per restaurant.34 In fact, there was even an 
absolute increase in employment in New Jersey and a drop in 
Pennsylvania.35 While, employment at the restaurants Card and 
Krueger surveyed in New Jersey went from 20.44 FTE employees per 
restaurant to 21.03, in Pennsylvania, it fell from 23.33 to 21.17.36 Card 
 
 33 Abadie, supra note 32, at 1 (defining difference-in-differences as “the treatment, an 
untreated comparison group can be used to identify temporal variation in the outcome that is not 
due to treatment exposure”). 
 34 CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 28, at 33. 
 35 Id. at 34. 
 36 Id. 
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and Krueger (1995) conjectured that the result could be due to the 
monopsony position of the firm.37 If the firm has market power 
recruiting workers, it might want to pay them a higher wage to fill its 
vacancies more quickly. However, if the firm pays more to new recruits, 
it will be hard for it not to also raise the wage of existing workers, losing 
more in doing so than the gain in filled vacancies. A small increase in 
the minimum wage will make the firm lose some profit, but it will fill 
the vacancies more quickly, leading to a higher level of employment.38 
Card and Krueger’s research has had a large impact in economics 
and policy circles. As of April 26, 2017, the paper has 2,301 Google 
scholar citations and the book 2,380.39 Moreover, Card and Krueger’s 
findings have changed the opinion of many economists. 
The Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago 
Booth School of Business runs a survey of economic experts. In the 
survey, some of the leading members of the profession are asked about 
their opinions on public policy issues. In September 2015, the experts 
were asked: “Question A: If the federal minimum wage is raised 
gradually to $15-per-hour by 2020, the employment rate for low-wage 
US workers will be substantially lower than it would be under the 
status quo.” 
Of the forty-two economists who answered the question, 5% 
strongly agreed with it, 21% agreed with it, 38% were uncertain, 24% 
disagreed, 0% strongly disagreed, and 0% had no opinion. That 62% of 
top economists either disagreed or were uncertain about the effects on 
employment of more than a doubling of the federal minimum wage 
against the intuition of Figure 3 is a tribute to the importance of Card 
and Krueger’s work. In fact, the studies were mentioned either 
explicitly or implicitly by several of the respondents.40 
 
 37 Id. at 11–13. 
 38 The idea that monopsony power may induce an increase in employment after an increase 
in the minimum wage is an old one. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage 
Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358, 358–365 (1946). A related possibility is that a higher wage 
might increase productivity by making workers value their jobs more, as in the efficiency wages 
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz. See Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment 
as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 433–44 (1984). Efficiency wages by 
themselves will limit the effect of a hike in the minimum wage, but in the absence of other 
complementary mechanisms, they will cause an increase in employment. 
 39 Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=0&q=Minim 
um+Wages+and+Employment:+Case+Study+of+the+Fast+Food+Industry+in+New+Jersey+and+
Pennsylvania+American+Economic+Review&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14 [https://perma.cc/TE46-LM8Z]; 
MYTH AND MEASUREMENT, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=myth+and+ 
measurement&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C14 [https://perma.cc/2NV6-JPKG]. 
 40 Initiative on Global Markets, $15 Minimum Wage, CHICAGO BOOTH (Sept. 22, 2015), http:// 
www.igmchicago.org/surveys/15-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/52NZ-EGVV]. 
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V. NOT SO FAST . . .  
Card and Krueger’s results were sensational because they 
challenged a centuries-old understanding in economics. Also, their 
findings rationalized a policy intervention that has had strong political 
backing for almost as long. But sensational results invite close 
examination, and Card and Krueger’s findings have not held up to that 
torrent. 
Much of the discussion has involved the construction of the data 
and an assessment of whether the assumptions behind the DID held in 
practice. Among issues about data collection, the study of Neumark and 
Wascher 41 is of particular importance. The authors show how the use 
of administrative payroll data in a similar sample of fast-food 
restaurants leads to conclusions opposite to those in the original 
study.42 Payroll data is likely to be more reliable than phone survey 
data because of the restaurants’ legal obligations to accurately report 
taxable income and because it avoids ambiguities in the questions in 
Card and Krueger’s original survey. Neumark and Wascher find that 
employment in New Jersey fast-food restaurants declined between 3.9% 
and 4.0% relative to the Pennsylvania control group.43 This corresponds 
to a short-run elasticity of -0.21 to -0.22.44 
Among issues concerning the DID assumptions, the idea that New 
Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania shared a common trend is 
problematic. If you recall the map in Figure 4, the sample of restaurants 
in New Jersey includes observations in the southern portion of the New 
York metropolitan area, in the eastern suburbs of Philadelphia, and at 
the Jersey Shore. These regions, although related, had different trends. 
More generally, Meer and West argue that the minimum wage impacts 
employment through changes in growth rates,45 rather than through an 
immediate drop in relative employment levels, as Card and Krueger 
postulate. Finally, the increase in the minimum wage in New Jersey 
was announced two years in advance (although there was some political 
uncertainty regarding whether the increase would be implemented). 
 
 41 David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of 
the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1362, 1362–
1396 (2000). 
 42 Id. at 1362–63. 
 43 Id. at 1363. 
 44 For a reply, see David Card & Alan B. Krueger, A Reanalysis of the Effect of the New Jersey 
Minimum Wage Increase on the Fast-Food Industry with Representative Payroll Data 1–2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6386, 1998) (challenging the research done by 
Neumark and Wascher, claiming their samples may not have been as representative). 
 45 Jonathan Meer & Jeremy West, Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment Dynamics, 
51 J. Hum. Resources 500, 500 (2016). 
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Therefore, the restaurants in New Jersey might have already at least 
partially responded to the minimum wage hike by the start of the 
survey. 
Other authors looked at borders between other states that had 
similar experiences. The results of those replication effects are mixed. 
Reviews of these studies have been compiled by Neumark and 
Wascher46 with a negative view on the effects of minimum wages, and 
by Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer,47 with a more positive 
assessment. 
My reading of this literature is that there is a tentative empirical 
consensus that the short-run employment effects of temporary, modest 
minimum wage increases, such as those studied by Card and Krueger, 
are probably negative, but small. Parsing the previous sentence shows 
us, however, how limited this statement is. It requires three conditions 
(“short-run,” “temporary,” and “modest”) and it is subject to non-trivial 
uncertainty (“probably”). Let us forget about uncertainty, as it is 
inherent in any social science question and requiring its own comments 
about decision-making in such circumstances, and let us focus on the 
three conditions. 
A. Short-Run 
Card and Krueger documented the short-run effects (ten months 
ahead) of an increase in the minimum wage.48 But there are many 
situations in economics where short- and long-run effects can be quite 
different. For example, most drivers will initially respond little to an 
increase in gas prices. They need the car to commute to work or to take 
the kids to school. A higher gas price may only induce more economical 
driving or the elimination of a few trips. However, when in a few years, 
drivers face the need to buy a new car, a higher gas price may induce 
many of them to trade down a gas-guzzling SUV for a thrifty hybrid or, 
when they change residence, to search for a dwelling closer to work. 
A similar mechanism works with fast-food restaurants. In the 
short-run, restaurants might have few options to economize on labor. 
They have so many tables to serve and the kitchen works in a particular 
way. At the margin, the restaurant might close earlier or accept larger 
queues, but those options are limited. 
But, in the long-run, restaurant owners can exploit many margins 
of adjustment. The first margin of adjustment is to reorganize the 
 
 46 See generally DAVID NEUMARK & WILLIAM L. WASCHER, MINIMUM WAGES (2008). 
 47 Sylvia Allegretto, et al., Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies 4 (Inst. for 
the Study of Lab. (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 7638, 2013). 
 48 See generally Card & Krueger, supra note 27. 
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kitchen to use more capital (mechanical food processors instead of 
manual workers), install more automated services (self-help counters), 
rearrange the layout of the restaurant, etc. These changes are costly 
and will only be undertaken the next time the restaurant requires an 
overhaul (although the overhaul itself may be pushed forward by the 
desire to lower labor costs). Economists refer to this phenomenon as 
putty-clay technologies.49 We say that a production system is ex-ante 
putty when there is a wide range of choices before the system is 
installed regarding how it will operate. There are many ways to 
combine capital and labor to produce a good or a service. We say that a 
production system is ex-post clay when, once it has been installed, it 
requires a fixed proportion of capital and labor, with no substitution 
between the two, and does not have the ability to easily scrap the capital 
and transform it back into other goods and services.50 
Putty-clay technologies generate large differences between short- 
and long-run responses to changes in their relative prices. The 
importance of this phenomenon has been quantified by Sorkin, who 
concludes: 
As such, the paper suggests that it would be a mistake to infer 
from existing empirical work on the employment effects of 
minimum wage increases that the President’s 2013 proposal to 
index minimum wages to inflation would have minimal effects 
on employment. Taking the model at face value shows how 
misleading such an inference might be: the results in Table 2 
show that a contemporaneous elasticity of -0.002 in response to 
a temporary increase is consistent with an elasticity after 6 
years of -0.252 for a permanent increase.51 
From a historical perspective, Seltzer has documented how the 
seamless hosiery industry in the U.S. South substituted capital for 
labor over the long-run (but not in the short-run) after the passing of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and its provisions on the 
minimum wage.52 
 
 49 Isaac Sorkin, Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum Wage?, 18 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 
306, 307 (2015) (describing putty-clay as the ability to “freely substitute between capital and labor” 
at the outset of a project, but the firm cannot change the labor scheme once the capital is in place). 
 50 The definition in the main text is a simplification of a more formal characterization. For 
example, we could introduce more input factors (energy, land, etc.). 
 51 Sorkin, supra note 49, at 322. 
 52 Seltzer, supra note 1, at 396. Seltzer also shows how in the lumber industry many firms 
either ignored the provisions of the act or withdrew from interstate commerce (and, thus, were 
exempted from the minimum wage regulations). Id. at 410–13. Seltzer’s comparison of the effects 
across industries reveals the heterogeneity of responses to the same regulation among sectors. See 
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Card and Krueger (1995) dismissed the importance of the short- vs. 
long-run distinction53 by arguing that an increase in FTE employment 
in the short-run seems unlikely to accompany a reduction in long-run 
employment, that fast-food restaurants have plenty of f lexibility in 
changing their staff levels, and that the high turnover rates of workers 
in this business make adjustment potentially fast.54 I find all three 
responses unconvincing. In the long-run, the production of food can be 
organized in many ways, but that new structure will not appear until 
the restaurant has been overhauled (or substituted by a new one). If the 
monopsony argument proposed by Card and Krueger holds but 
technology is putty-clay, it is perfectly compatible to have a short-run 
increase in employment with substantial long-run reductions in labor 
demand. 
The second margin of adjustment is the entry and exit from the 
restaurant business. Those restaurants that suffer more from the 
increase in minimum wages (for example, because the preparation of 
the fast-food they serve is harder to automate) will tend to close faster, 
while new restaurants that are better at saving labor will enter the 
market more frequently. 
Aaronson, French, Sorkin, and To have studied the role that the 
entry and exit of establishments play in the restaurant industry after a 
minimum wage hike.55 These researchers used data from the Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) to measure the effects of 
five hikes in state minimum wages in the early and mid-2000s in fast-
food restaurants.56 They found that a higher minimum wage leads to 
more restaurants exiting the industry and, conversely, to more new 
restaurants entering the industry.57 In concrete terms, after a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage, the exit rate of fast-food restaurants 
 
id. at 414 (“In both industries the wages of a large proportion of the workforce had to be increased 
in order to bring firms into compliance with the [Fair Labor Standards Act].”) However, it is 
important to note that methods for adjusting to these changes varied between the seamless hosiery 
and lumber industries. Id. It is entirely possible that the responses of the fast-food industry to 
changes in the minimum wage are rather different from the responses of other industries or we 
can even see divergent responses within the fast-food industry (budget fast-food at Burger King 
vs. premium fast-food at Chipotle). 
 53 See CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 28, at 67; see also id. at 367 (admitting that the distinction 
between short-run and long-run responses to minimum wage is important, but hard to 
differentiate between). Card and Krueger find that sunk costs and costly adjustments may mean 
changes take longer to occur, or the costs will initially be borne by the firm owners, resulting in no 
short-run price responses to increased wages. Id. 
 54 Id. at 367–69 (concluding that employment effects from changes to minimum wage are close 
to zero when using the standard model; noting other models that allow firms some discretion in 
setting their prices have very different effects on employment). 
 55 Aaronson et al., supra note 4, at 9–13. 
 56 Id. at 5–6. 
 57 Id. at 9–13. 
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increased from 5.7% a year to 7.1%.58 Employment levels remained 
roughly the same in continuing restaurants, with only small decreases. 
These results suggest that the research design in Card and Krueger 
(1994) and Card and Krueger (1995) may miss a central component of 
the employment adjustment. 
The third margin of adjustment is directed technological change. 
Many scientific and technical improvements are the result of economic 
incentives. If there is profit to be gained from a new and better product, 
inventors and entrepreneurs will spend time and resources developing 
such a product. The classic illustration of this process is the evolution 
of the horseshoe.59 Even if the horseshoe had been around since at least 
the Early Middle Ages (and one could suspect that such a simple 
technology had already reached its peak of efficiency), the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a burst of remarkable 
advances in horseshoe technology. By that time, the U.S. and other 
Western countries had become sufficiently affluent as to allow many 
families to own horses. This phenomenon created a large market for 
horseshoes that inventors and entrepreneurs rushed to satisfy. Then, 
when the automobile replaced most horses, the spurt of horseshoe 
innovations ceased. One could only guess where the horseshoe 
technology would be today if the market for this product had remained 
vigorous. 
An increase in the minimum wage will, therefore, induce 
technological change aimed at saving labor. Even if, with today’s 
technology, it may be difficult to run a fast-food restaurant with fewer 
workers, the situation may radically vary in a few years after a national 
increase in the minimum wage. Directed technological change confirms, 
again, that short- and long-run employment responses to changes in 
labor market regulations can be dramatically different.60 
 
 58 Id. at 9. Interestingly, the result is more than twice as strong among fast-food restaurants 
that belong to chains. The owners of non-chain fast-food restaurants may have limited outside 
opportunities and have to live with the higher minimum wage. 
 59 JACOB SCHMOOKLER, INVENTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 91–94 (1966). 
 60 I will close this subsection by indulging in some personal recollection. When I arrived in 
Minnesota, in August 1996, to obtain my Ph.D. in economics, I was surprised at the absence of 
automatic machines to pay for your ticket at downtown parking lots in Minneapolis. Instead, all 
parking lots I patronized had an attendant in a booth accepting payment. In Madrid (Spain), 
automatic payment machines had been in widespread use for many years. The reason, of course, 
was not the technological superiority of Madrid over Minneapolis, but the higher relative minimum 
wage in Spain. Given the expensive automatic pay machines of the mid-1990s, it was profitable to 
substitute labor for capital in Madrid, but not in Minneapolis. Only after the drop in the price of 
these machines did they became common in the U.S. 
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B. Temporary 
A striking feature of the evolution of the minimum wage in the U.S. 
over time has been its “saw-toothed” pattern. The nominal minimum 
wage has been raised from time to time, but at the federal level (and in 
most states and cities) without any provision for automatic cost-of-
living adjustments.61 Thus, over time, inflation and increases in 
productivity have eroded the impact of those increases. In Figure 5, an 
updated version of Figure 4 in Brown,62 I plot the minimum wage 
relative to average hourly earnings in the U.S. private sector. 
The “saw-toothed pattern” means that firms are likely to respond 
much less to increases in the minimum wage if they forecast that the 
labor cost (nominal wages over nominal productivity) will return, in a 
short period, to previous levels. By looking at the evolution of the real 
cost of this minimum wage, the finding that minimum wage increases 
do not affect employment is not surprising. In terms of the present-
discounted value, often there has not been much of an increase. 
 
 
Figure 5: Minimum wage relative to average hourly earnings in the U.S.63 
 
 61 Brown, supra note 4, at 2111–13. 
 62 Id. at 2113. 
 63 See id. (depicting an earlier version of this graph, which is current through the year 2000). 
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C. Modest 
In 1992, New Jersey increased its minimum hourly wage 18.8%, 
from $4.25 to $5.05.64 While this increase was not trivial, it was not too 
large either: given an inflation rate in 1992 of 3.0%,65 the real increase 
was only 15.8%. 
The way in which firms respond to a 50% change and to a 15.8% 
real change in minimum wages can be fundamentally different. 
Economic activity is subject to adjustment costs.66 I may not change my 
cell phone provider if it increases my plan price by 15.8% because the 
opportunity cost of searching for a new provider is too high), but I may 
do so if the increase is 50%. Adjustment costs generate non-linearities 
in behavior: there is no presumption that the response to a 40% increase 
in minimum wages should be twice as large as the response to a 20% 
increase. While the evidence of Card and Krueger may be informative 
for the responses of employment to a 15–25 % change in the minimum 
wage, it says next to nothing about the responses to increases of 50% or 
higher, such as those proposed in the recent policy debate. Krueger 
himself acknowledges “a $15-an-hour national minimum wage would 
put us in uncharted waters, and risk undesirable and unintended 
consequences.”67 
D. Other Aspects 
The previous paragraphs have omitted many additional aspects of 
the minimum wage legislation. For completeness, I will briefly 
comment on three aspects that I find of outmost interest. 
First, Card and Krueger (1995) reported a 4% relative increase in 
the pretax price of a full meal in New Jersey’s fast-food restaurants in 
comparison with Pennsylvania’s restaurants.68 This increase in prices 
is intuitive: restaurants with some market power, since all restaurants 
engage in monopolistic competition, will pass through some of the 
higher labor cost to consumers. On the one hand, the higher price paid 
 
 64 Card & Krueger, supra note 27, at 772. 
 65 Consumer Price Index Data from 1913 to 2017, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/consumer-price-index-and-annual-percent-change 
s-from-1913-to-2008/ [https://perma.cc/43QF-QA3A]. 
 66 Sorkin, supra note 49, at 308 (defining adjustment costs as the “significant and lumpy costs” 
firms experience when adjusting labor, which may be incurred when responding to the number of 
jobs or changing the identity of workers). 
 67 Alan B. Krueger, The Minimum Wage: How Much Is Too Much?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the-minimum-wage-how-much-is-too-much. 
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WBP2-Q5XA]. 
 68 CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 28, at 54. 
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by consumers generates a lower demand for other goods and services. 
On the other hand, there is also a higher demand from workers who 
have seen their wages increase. How these two mechanisms balance in 
the aggregate economy is hard to predict. This difficulty tells us that 
the overall effects on employment at the aggregate level of a change in 
the minimum wage can be different from the results at the industry 
level. Firms can also adjust other margins, such as lowering on-the-job 
training and fringe benefits, changing their recruitment policies (for 
example, being more reluctant to hire workers without experience), or 
worsening job conditions (for instance, more inconvenient and irregular 
work shifts). Unfortunately, there is little research quantifying these 
additional margins. 
Second, a higher minimum wage can have a perverse impact on 
human capital accumulation.69 By increasing the relative wage of low-
skill work, young people will face a lower incentive to go to school or 
acquire new skills, lowering aggregate productivity. The 
counterargument that a higher wage for younger workers may help 
them finance further education runs against the evidence that 
borrowing constraints do not seem to matter much for educational 
attainment.70 
Third, a higher minimum wage has important redistribution 
aspects.71 Some workers (those who see their wages increase and retain 
their jobs) will be better off, while others (those who lose their jobs or 
those who must pay for more expensive fast-food meals) will be worse 
off. Similarly, some business owners will be better off (those having 
restaurants near establishments that exit the market because of the 
higher minimum wage or the sellers of machinery that substitutes for 
labor) and others will lose (the no-chain restaurant owners whose profit 
margins drop). An analysis of this redistribution is, hence, crucial to 
assess the efficacy of changes to the minimum wage. MaCurdy has 
recently attempted such a calculation, with an overall negative 
assessment of the minimum wage as an antipoverty policy tool.72 
 
 69 Brown, supra note 4, at 2145–46. 
 70 Stephen V. Cameron & Christopher Taber, Estimation of Educational Borrowing 
Constraints Using Returns to Schooling, 112 J. POL. ECON. 132, 132 (2004). 
 71 Thomas MaCurdy, How Effective Is the Minimum Wage at Supporting the Poor?, 123 J. POL. 
ECON. 497, 498 (2015) (“[A] number of studies have documented [benefits from higher 
earnings,] . . . [b]ut someone must pay for the higher earnings received by the low-wage workers.”). 
 72 Id. at 536 (“Far more poor families suffer reductions in resources than those who gain, and 
as many rich families gain as poor families. These income transfer properties of the minimum 
wage reveal it to be an ineffectual antipoverty policy.”). 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The previous section illustrates how little evidence there actually 
is to overturn our old understanding in Figure 3, reinforced by centuries 
of historical experience, on the effect of minimum wages. 
What the last two decades of research on minimum wages have 
taught us beyond Figure 3 is very limited. As I summarized above, the 
short-run employment effects of temporary, modest minimum wage 
increases are probably negative, but small. But, in some sense, we 
already knew that. A small temporary treatment is likely to have, most 
of the time, a small effect. Despite the enormous amount of brain power 
and high-tech econometrics displayed by the participants in the debate, 
we have likely ended where we started. I do not say this is as a criticism 
of the different authors cited in this paper, but as a recognition of the 
tremendous hurdles that empirical work faces. 
First, the data are limited and subject to measurement error. We 
would need to know many more details about the different 
establishments in the U.S. economy than those we can find in BED or 
JOLTS. Second, we would need long samples of data to measure both 
the short- and long-run effects of changes in minimum wages. Third, we 
would need accurate information about workers and consumers and 
how they respond to changes in wages and prices. Fourth, we would 
need good economic models to trace the aggregate effects of these 
changes. All this is well beyond our current capability.73 
But this also means that the current empirical work is next-to-
useless in evaluating the employment and welfare effects of the current 
efforts by many cities and states to move to a $15 minimum hourly wage 
(indexed, also, to inflation). A candid assessment of the literature can 
only reach the conclusion that those politicians and activists claiming 
that academic research supports their “fight for $15” may not be 
considering all relevant factors. 
We will need to wait many years before the effects of the “fight for 
$15” become clearer. Some preliminary estimates at Seattle are not 
encouraging.74 Personally, coming from Europe and having experienced 
 
 73 A researcher would need to use a general equilibrium model to trace aggregate effects. For 
example, if you increase the minimum wage, firms will move toward more capital-intensive 
technologies, which will have an impact on the rate of return on capital and, therefore, on savings 
by households. These effects require extremely complicated models that we do not have the 
capability to build, solve, or estimate. 
 74 THE SEATTLE MINIMUM WAGE STUDY TEAM, UNIV. WASH. REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF 
SEATTLE’S MINIMUM WAGE ORDINANCE ON WAGES, WORKERS, JOBS, AND ESTABLISHMENTS 
THROUGH 2015 3 (2016) (“Seattle’s low-wage workers show some preliminary signs of lagging 
behind similar workers in comparison regions. . . . It appears that the Minimum Wage Ordinance 
modestly held back Seattle’s employment of low-wage workers relative to the level we could have 
06 FERNANDEZ VILLAVERDE PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  9:11 AM 
140  THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2017 
 
what high minimum wages and strict labor market regulations do 
(which looks much closer to the straightforward intuition in Figure 3 
than to Card and Krueger’s findings), I have a tight negative prior about 
the outcome of the experiment, but only time will tell. 
In this paper, I have argued that we know very little about how the 
U.S. job market works and that we cannot even answer simple 
questions (what is the effect on employment of a change in the 
minimum wage?) with enough confidence to overturn the crushing, 
deductive logic of traditional economics. 
Furthermore, we are observing several worrisome developments 
that may be related to growing and uncertain regulations such as the 
“fight for $15.” In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we saw how the levels of job 
creation and job destruction are now considerably lower than in the 
recent past. The sum of both gives us a measure of resource reallocation 
in the U.S. economy. The negative trend in such reallocation is likely to 
be a harbinger of bad times for growth. 
 
 
Figure 6: Startup and exit rates for firms in the U.S. non-farm sector75 
Even clearer is Figure 6, where Professor Haltiwanger plots the 
annual startup and exit rate of firms and establishments in the U.S. 
private non-farm sector from the Business Employment Dynamic 
 
expected.”). 
 75 Haltiwanger, supra note 1, at 16. 
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dataset of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The declining trend of 
startups is alarming. The Microsofts, Googles, and Amazons of the 
future are not being created today. We are moving to an economy of 
consolidated firms with fewer new entrants and lower productivity 
growth.76 In a couple of decades, this lower productivity growth will 
translate into much larger welfare losses for workers than anything 
that can be gained today from a higher minimum wage. Let us 
concentrate on what matters. 
 
 76 According to the Penn World Table 9.0, Penn World Table Version 9.0, UNIVERSITY OF 
GRONINGEN, http://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/ [https://perma.cc/WH7S-SGKM]), a stan-
dard source among economists for growth and productivity data the United States total factor 
productivity grew, between 1950 and 2004, at a 1.0% annual rate. Between 2004 and 2014, total 
factor productivity grew at a 0.4% annual rate. At a 1.0% annual growth rate, total factor 
productivity doubles every 70 years. At a 0.4% annual rate, it doubles every 173. 
